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Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish
Collaboration and the Special Night
Squads in Palestine during the Arab
Revolt, 1938–39
Matthew Hughes
In 1938 in British Mandate Palestine, British army officer Orde Wingate organised and
led a joint British-Jewish military unit, the Special Night Squads (SNSs), to defeat
Palestinian rebels fighting against British rule and Jewish immigration to Palestine
during the Arab revolt, 1936–39. The SNSs operated in Galilee in northern Palestine.
While biographies of Wingate cover his service in Palestine with the squads, this
article extends the existing literature with an empirical examination of the operations
of the SNSs based on a deep mining of British and Hebrew-language archival sources.
This study argues that joint intelligence gathering operations introduced the British
army to Jewish agents and the possibilities of collaboration—Wingate was an intelligence
officer—before detailing combined military operations in the field with the irregular
SNSs. The originality of this article comes from its dissection of how British soldiers bru-
talised Jewish troops by training them in well-established British counterinsurgency
methods that targeted civilians and villages close to rebel attacks. Away from the
control of established British military chains of command, the SNSs were especially
tough in their war with Palestinians and they fought a ‘dirty war’, an operational
method absorbed and normalised by Jewish soldiers serving under British command.
This article is a military and imperial history that details the quotidian brutality of
pacification, opens up wider debates on how imperial powers collaborated with loyalist
colonial minorities, shows how regular armies used irregular forces in pacification cam-
paigns and suggests that post-colonial regimes such as Israel carried over such methods
of control.
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Introduction
When the British army deployed to Palestine in April 1936 at the start of the Arab
revolt against British colonial rule and Jewish immigration to the country, it collabo-
rated with the Jewish settlers there as a ‘loyalist’ force against Palestinian insurgents.
The army readily turned to minority communities for colonial control, to recruit as
soldiers, divide its enemies and to gather intelligence: Sikhs and Gurkhas in India,
or after 1945 Turkish Cypriots, aboriginal trackers in Malaya, Kikuyu loyalists in
Kenya and Protestants in Ireland.1 Jewish military collaboration with the British
army is the subject of this article, leaving aside the recruitment by the colonial govern-
ment of thousands of extra Jewish settlement and supernumerary police, almost
15,000 according to one source.2 Army-Jewish collaboration started with shared intel-
ligence gathering, a combination that morphed into joint military units, notably the
unconventional Special Night Squads (SNSs) that fought in Galilee in northern Pales-
tine in 1938–39 and were led by the Nazareth-based British Army intelligence officer
Captain Orde Wingate, a dedicated (Christian) Zionist who died in Burma in 1944
leading irregular forces against the Japanese. British commitment to the SNSs initially
took the form of three platoons of 37 British soldiers based in Jewish settlements such
as Hanita and Ein Harod and commanded by three subalterns seconded from Briga-
dier John Evetts’ Haifa-based 16th Brigade: Lieutenants Mike Grove (Queen’s Own
Royal West Kent Regiment), Robert ‘Rex’ King-Clark (Manchester Regiment) and
H. E. N. ‘Bala’ Bredin (Royal Ulster Rifles).3 Evetts had ‘encouraged’ Wingate to recon-
noitre Galilee and draw up a ‘detailed plan’ for the ‘establishment of Jewish counter-
insurgency units which would operate at night with the support of British troops . . . .
The policy had the blessing of Force Headquarters in Jerusalem but because it was con-
sidered to be an irregular practice few papers ever mentioned it.’4 Wingate led patrols
and was wounded doing so at the village of Dabburiyya in July 1938. Large numbers of
Jewish soldiers from the Zionist defence organisation Haganah (The Defence) keen to
get formal military training from the British passed through the SNSs, including many
future Israeli commanders such as Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan. Haganah became the
Israeli army in 1948.
The supreme general officer commanding (GOC) in Palestine in early 1938, General
Archibald Wavell, had lent his support to Wingate, but his successor, General Robert
Haining, and the high command in Jerusalem were uncomfortable with unconven-
tional warfare and the army eventually demanded Wingate’s departure from Palestine
in October 1938, spurred on by reports of SNS brutality. Command of the SNSs then
passed to Bredin. When Wingate returned in December 1938, it was to a desk job and
he had no access to secret papers, not least to stop him leaking documents to Jewish
friends, which Wingate did little to hide.5 The British disbanded the last squad in July
1939.6 The SNSs prompted ‘night’ action elsewhere. The West Yorkshire Regiment ran
its own ‘special night squads’, although it is not clear from the battalion intelligence
summaries if these included Jewish soldiers or not.7 Meanwhile, the Jewish Tel Aviv
municipal authority asked the British in August 1938 if it could form ‘so-called
night squads’: ‘The Jewish population of the South will be as ready as that of the
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North to provide the requisite number of men of good quality to take part in the offen-
sive operations of this kind.’8 These enterprises faded with Wingate’s departure from
Palestine.
This study of the SNSs argues that tough, often brutal, exemplary action was stan-
dard military counterinsurgency practice for the British soldiers leading the SNSs,
easily employed by them against local civilians and insurgents, and then passed on
to Jewish soldiers training and fighting with the unit. British military counter-rebel
practice and doctrine had always been harsh and openly targeted civilians but soldiers’
humanity, civil oversight, legal strictures, public and press scrutiny, rebel counter-
measures and the colonial state’s hierarchy of race—with ‘white’ insurgents usually
treated less harshly—mitigated military action.9 Moreover, soldiers rotated through
Palestine on time-bounded regimental tours of duty on what was for them another
interesting colonial posting and they were not interested in the country’s fate and so
had no personal animosity for Palestinians beyond their being in revolt. When
asked whether he or his men knew anything about Palestine before shipping out
from the UK in 1938, King-Clark remembered in his memoirs how ‘at that time, in
the Army at least there was almost total indifference in and ignorance of political
affairs—among the younger officers and men, anyway’.10 This was not the case with
the independently minded SNSs. The mercurial Wingate was a fanatical supporter
of a Jewish state and he filled the SNSs with Jewish soldiers training for a future
war of survival against the local Palestinians, which would come in 1948. This, along-
side the lack of a formal military chain of command, meant that brutality by the SNSs
quickly spiralled out of control, upsetting senior officers mindful of the negative
impact of atrocity stories, and was one of the reasons that they eventually curtailed
and then closed down the unit. It is difficult uncovering the brutality inherent in mili-
tary operations but the night-time actions of the SNSs are especially murky and ‘wild’,
as will be discussed below.11 British SNS brutality prompted Jewish soldiers, taught
them how to deal with insurgency and insurgents and set this within a colonial
legal framework of collective punishment and punitive action that normalised draco-
nian action.
Intelligence Sharing
The British army and Royal Air Force (RAF) special service officers (SSOs) who dealt
with political-intelligence matters in the region collaborated from the outset of the
Arab revolt with the Jews in Palestine for intelligence gathering, drawing on the
Jews’ good intelligence on the enemy, their Palestinian informers and their native
Arabic-speakers.12 The SSOs ran intelligence in Palestine before the revolt and the
army tapped into their expertise, using them for informers and field intelligence.
For instance, in late 1936, Joshua Gordon was the Jewish Agency’s liaison with the
RAF intelligence officer in Nablus, Captain Windsor, known to the Jews as ‘The
Duke’.13 In 1938, Windsor set up a meeting between the key Jewish agent Ezra
Danin and army officer Captain Fitzpatrick, intelligence officer for the 9th Royal
Hussars. Colonel Lash replaced Windsor, codenamed ‘The Lion’ by the Jews, and
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referenced as (later) Brigadier Norman Lash of Jordan’s Arab Legion.14 J. P. Domville
was another pivotal British SSO intelligence operative, who went on to serve in Iraq
after December 1937.15 Reuven Zaslany (later Shiloah) was Domville’s interpreter
and they were friends well into the 1940s. The Jewish political leader, David Ben
Gurion, met with Domville. Earlier, in 1934, Hos, another Jewish agent, had charac-
terised Domville as the country’s ‘best Zionist informer on the English’.16 There was
another SSO officer much used by the Jews, Hackett, Jews referring to him as
A. Hackett-Fine, a phonetic transliteration from Hebrew, codenamed ‘Khamis’ and
an MI5 or MI6 agent, who replaced Lash and with whom Danin was ‘tight’.17 Danin
acted as arbiter between the police and the army on the value of captured intelligence,
he decoded and translated Arabic documents, and the British even allowed him to
interrogate captured rebels.18
The mutually beneficial relationship during the Arab revolt between the Jewish and
British intelligence communities underpinned British military operations, and
Wingate as an intelligence officer in Palestine from 1936 had established excellent
relations with the Jewish intelligence branch, which would become Shai (Information
Service) in 1940 and then military intelligence and Shabak (General Security Service)
in 1948. Talking to one of Wingate’s biographers many years later, King-Clark remem-
bered that his superior officer had a ‘secure intelligence network through the Jewish
Agency’.19 Mike Grove noted Wingate’s contacts with the Jews, ‘from the top down-
wards’, including the future Israeli president, Chaim Weizmann: ‘to the heads of all
the settlements. They all knew Wingate.’20 Danin had firm links to British intelligence
officers and his 1944 published collection of captured Arabic documents bears resem-
blance to the reams of captured Arabic-language intelligence material stored in Win-
gate’s microfilmed Palestine papers held in the British Library in London, much of
which came from Jewish operatives.21 Wingate’s Palestine papers prove that he was
exchanging masses of secret documents with the Jews.
The Jews helped to direct British operations, as counterinsurgency demanded good
intelligence and the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) had the upper hand
here, as its intelligence on the Palestinians was so good. Jews also dressed in army uni-
forms on operations with the British, and British soldiers dressed as Jews in civilian
clothes.22 The Jews and the British also encouraged Arab loyalist anti-rebel forces, a
subject discussed in full elsewhere.23 Thus, Danin noted many years later that
Pinhas Meital, a Jewish officer from Hadera, possibly in the police, mediated with
the British for the return of loyalist Arabs to Palestine in 1938.24 Meanwhile, Jews
such as David Hacohen of Haifa paid Arab loyalists.25 The Jews also supplied the
anti-rebel Palestinian Nashashibi family with weapons; the issue is whether the
British supplied these guns, via the Jews, which seems probable.26 The Jews looked
to the British and to Palestinians willing to collaborate to achieve their aim of
gathering intelligence, getting military training and weakening the Palestinians. The
British were supporting the Yishuv with the strength of the British armed force—
the SNSs being one example—and in so doing gave men such as Danin access to
the heart of the British military machine. Jewish intelligence infiltrated British security
structures, stealing police files and so was better able to monitor Palestinian
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resistance.27 Similar things happened elsewhere in the British Empire, such as in Kenya
in the 1950s, another colony with an articulate, non-native ‘white’ settler community,
where the British handed over parts of their military operations to the settlers of the
Kenya Regiment and the Kenya Police Reserve, units that committed the worst
abuses against Mau Mau fighters.28 The SNSs grew from British-Jewish intelligence
sharing.
The British High Command and the Special Night Squads
Wavell and Haining sanctioned the SNSs but army headquarters was ambivalent about
irregular warfare and the employment of levels of force that were unjustifiable even by
the draconian emergency laws in place at the time. There were official limits to paci-
fication and Haining had urged his divisional commanders to punish ‘unnecessary
violence, vindictiveness which is un-British, killing in cold blood’.29 As the army
never instituted full martial law in Palestine, civil colonial officials still held sway
and their protests were another friction on military excesses. One army intelligence
officer recalled how a district commissioner (DC)—obviously Hugh Foot, the
future Lord Caradon, who went on to become governor of Cyprus—warned a Pales-
tinian village of a forthcoming army raid, and so a senior officer ‘took the D.C. by the
throat and shook him and called him a “bloody traitor”. THE D.C. IS NOW LORD
CARADON.’30 Foot saw at first-hand the effects of Wingate’s work, as the latter
‘wiped out opposition gangs by killing them all. He was taking sides. It was a dirty
war of assassination and counter-assassination. I don’t think we should have got
mixed up in that.’31 Evetts’ brigade in Haifa was in charge of the SNSs’ zone of oper-
ations and his local command protected Wingate’s force from headquarters and from
civil interference. Wingate and Evetts worked closely together, Evetts arranging for one
of Wingate’s informers to ‘escape’ police custody.32 Far from being a ‘cowboy outfit’,
the SNSs were ‘fully integrated’ into 16th Brigade’s counter-insurgency strategy.33
Evetts had a reputation for toughness towards Arab rebels: General Richard
O’Connor, in command in Jerusalem, wrote to his wife in November 1938, how
‘Jack Evetts has always (between ourselves) encouraged his men to be brutal, as
being in the end more humane. I disagree with him over this.’34 Evetts’ harshness
towards rebels chimed with Wingate’s, Evetts already being a ‘fan’ of Wingate, both
men willing to terrorise Palestinian villagers to force them to end support for the
revolt.35 Evetts’ divisional commander, General Bernard Montgomery, who arrived
in Palestine towards the end of the life of the SNSs, shared this tough approach,
leaving a local Anglican clergyman who was protesting about an army atrocity at
the village of al-Bassa, ‘absolutely bewildered’, the senior colonial officer Edward
Keith-Roach noted. ‘To every question, he said, Monty had but one reply: “I shall
shoot them.” “The man is blood mad”, the bishop moaned across my office table.’36
Support from Evetts and the SNSs delighted the Yishuv, giving the Jews both a
riposte to rebel terror attacks on Jewish settlements in Galilee and the opportunity
for military training. Thus, one senior Jewish official thanked Evetts effusively when
he left Palestine:
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We shall always gratefully remember your help, which has enabled us to be of some
assistance to the British Army in its campaign. You, Brigadier Evetts, and your offi-
cers have exerted your utmost efforts to establish our reputation and improve our
external appearance within the British Army, and for this we thank you most sin-
cerely. We regret, however, that at the moment of your departure you are compelled
to witness the passivity which has been imposed on us at a time when murder and
attacks on property are still of almost daily occurrence.37
Israel well remembered the help afforded by Wingate and his men, and Israel’s presi-
dent welcomed Bredin and King-Clark when they went on a trip to the country in
1988. Bredin ‘even had a hill named after him following one particularly spectacular
exploit’.38 Wingate— as ‘sinister as ever’ in King-Clark’s remembrance—started oper-
ations in June 1938 in ‘great glee . . . officially blessed and able to do as he want’, a bles-
sing that was eventually withdrawn, as the SNS operations turned so nasty and
irregular that they offended the military high command, committing outrages that
were systematic and systemic.39
Terror in Galilee: A Dirty War
Wingate and his men escalated and aggravated standard army counterinsurgency col-
lective punishment practices directed at Palestinian villagers suspected of harbouring
rebels, withholding information or being near insurgent attacks, such as the blowing
up of the Iraq Petroleum Company oil pipeline or ‘TAPline’ that ran across Galilee to
Haifa. Wingate told his men that they must strike hard in ‘reprisal’ attacks and on 11
June 1938 in one of the first operations, Bredin and his men chased an Arab band into
a village and threw grenades into houses.40 The SNSs in their five-month operational
life under Wingate from June to October 1938, and then under Bredin, carried out a
set of outrages at Kfar Hittin (or Kafr Hattin), Hittin, Nin (or Nein), Kufur Masr (or
Kafr Masr/Misr), Danna, Silat al-Dahr (pronounced Silat ed-Daher), Beisan (in
Hebrew Beit She’an) and in and around Dabburiyya, alongside cumulative acts of
extra-judicial brutality in unnamed villages. These all occurred in lower Galilee in
the Jezreel Valley or near Tiberias, excepting that at Silat al-Dahr, located south-
west of Jenin on the West Bank. The reference to the bayoneting at Khirbat Bayt
Lidd towards the end of this article is surely a reference to Khirbat Lidd/Lydd in
lower Galilee west of Afule, and not the settlement east of Netanya near Tel Aviv.
The names of other villages where there were incidents, when transliterated from
Arabic to Hebrew to English, make no sense or are not even Arabic sounding, such
as Kokomble where the British threatened to force oil-sodden soil into villagers’
mouths.41 In all these incidents, the argument is that Jewish fighters in the SNSs
learned from their British comrades about inflicting violence, impressed by how
British soldiers exercised imperial control, as their Hebrew-language personal accounts
of their time with the SNSs attest.42 At Kfar Hittin, Bredin executed three prisoners
brought to him by the Jews, proclaiming, ‘“In the name of the King of England, I
find you guilty of murder and sentence you to death”. . . . He immediately ordered
the English soldiers to carry out the sentence, and they shot the Arabs on the spot.
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In this, Bridden [sic] was following in the practices of Wingate.’43 This might be a
reference to an incident on 20 October 1938 witnessed by Jewish Sergeant Yigal
Allon who had gone with Bredin to ‘Hittin’ where they shot a running Arab and cap-
tured three suspects and who ‘on the way to the car they tried to escape and a squad
shot them’.44 Wingate told Corporal Howbrook and the men serving under King-Clark
that the Arabs were terrorising villagers, so his squad was ‘to terrorise the terrorists
kind of thing and catch them and just wipe them out’.45 Bredin stood out in his
actions, as King-Clark remembered:
Bala took a very tough line with the villagers near the pipeline—he could be a very
tough person, could Bala. In fact, some of the measures he took to prevent sabotage
were far from orthodox. On one occasion, in particular, when he took truly Draco-
nian action against a village which was harbouring gangsters, he very nearly came to
grief—but the result of his action was so successful in terms of preventing sub-
sequent sabotage, that his ‘iron fist’ method was conveniently filed away by
higher authority.46
As the squads moved closer to the settlers, they became embroiled; ‘the deeper Win-
gate’s policy took us into the Jewish camp, the more outside the law we became’, was
how King-Clark put it.47
The Palestine police picked up the dumped bodies of SNS assassinations in the
south of the country, suggesting a zone of squad operations stretching beyond
Galilee, or another ‘dirty war’ in southern Palestine. Police officer Richard Catling
saw what he thought were ‘remains’ of the SNSs. When asked what he meant by
this, he continued: ‘I was still in Jaffa at the time. Certainly, on two occasions we
picked up the bodies of dead Arabs that had been killed by these, this special unit
. . . . In the rural area surrounding Jaffa.’48 Such actions are reminiscent of the disposal
of bodies by the French army during the Algerian insurgency in the 1950s or by Latin
American armies later on. At times, dead Arabs were just ‘villagers who got in the way’,
caught in indiscriminate shooting by squads entering villagers suspected of harbour-
ing rebel fighters.49 The terror inflicted by the SNSs was of classical proportions: one
favoured method used by British and Jewish soldiers alike in Galilee was that of the
Roman legions—decimation, with variations on the proportion to be killed, and
aimed at intelligence gathering, rifle gathering or simply to instil fear into local villa-
gers. The Jews executed every eighth male villager in Kufur Masr (or Kafr Misr) to get
them to hand over illegally held rifles.50 Bredin killed every 15th man, three in total, in
a village that failed to produce rifles, as recalled by a former Jewish fighter called
Jonathan in the 1940s.51 Another group commanded by Bredin (Brodin in Hebrew)
demanded seven rifles in 15 minutes and Bredin told villagers he would kill every
tenth man if they were not forthcoming with the rifles, and the next time every
eighth man. Brigade headquarters called Bredin in after this incident, after which he
told his British and Jewish soldiers what to say in case of an official inquiry.52
Wingate also decimated villages.53 Palestinian villagers wrote a letter in English—com-
posed by a lawyer, the Jews thought—complaining that Jewish supernumerary officers
went into their village, lined up the men and shot every eighth man after not getting
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rifles. The Jews then said that they would return and kill everyone. This seems to have
been an SNS unit but the murky mix of violence in Galilee with other British officers
leading Jewish units and Jewish fighters acting unilaterally makes it difficult to deci-
pher events.54
Jewish settlers and squad soldiers shared the officially sanctioned violence of the
SNSs and they soaked up the accompanying training regimen. Wingate slapped and
struck Jewish soldiers in the squads, who took this as a necessary part of their drill
and called Wingate the ‘insane one’.55 Wingate never slapped British soldiers in the
SNSs, an action that was contrary to British military law, his lieutenants telling him
that they would never allow him to strike their men.56 The focus in the literature
on the more famous Wingate detracts from the day-to-day lessons learnt by the
Jews from British squad soldiers such as Bredin, about whom jumbled but consistent
stories emerge of executions and brutality.57 After a massacre of unarmed Jewish civi-
lians by rebels in Tiberias on 2 October 1938, the ‘Jews also were in a mood for killing
Arabs’ and with British servicemen present turned machine guns on the villagers of
Dabburiyya, on anyone entering or leaving the place and out in the open.58 Around
Dabburiyya after the Tiberias massacre, SNS men shot random Palestinians, as
when an ‘Englishman’ shot at an Arab by the village of Lubiya—possibly the villager
on the bicycle below—but he was unable to hit him with his pistol so he got a rifle
from a Jew and shot the man dead.59 The Tiberias massacre upset Bredin and he
also organised his men for a retaliatory attack on a Bedouin camp near to Dabburiyya
(or possibly in the Jordan valley) while aircraft machine-gunned their herds of
animals. During the battle, a British officer from the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force
arrived and started to fire indiscriminately into Bedouin tents.60 Bredin may not
have been a committed Zionist but he was attached to the Jews with whom he
served. On the way to Dabburiyya after the Tiberias massacre, Bredin and his men
met an Arab riding his bicycle. Breeden [sic] shot him dead—this helped a bit in
reviving the general atmosphere. When we arrived at Dabourria [sic] Breeden
gave orders not to have mercy and not behave like gentlemen . . . . I remember
that at the sight of a Jewish family, mother and children burnt in the Tiberias
fire, tears ran down Breeden’s cheeks and he said: ‘Would I be allowed to take
revenge, I would have eliminated all the Arabs.’61
Wingate attacked Dabburiyya after the Tiberias massacre, possibly in the same attack
detailed above, while Haganah intelligence later pinpointed Kfar Hittin as responsible
for the Tiberias massacre prompting a punitive raid by Bredin. 62 Squad soldiers also
provoked incidents, as when a Jewish soldier in the SNSs saw the force turn machine
guns on Arabs who had come out to extinguish a gasoline-induced fire started by the
SNS, killing 20. He also remembered how money seized from gang leaders was taken
for Jewish use, including a ‘slap-up’ meal in Afule.63 The Jewish fighter, Shlomo,
recalled how five soldiers, two Jews, two British and a British officer, went to the
village of Danna after a pipeline attack, possibly on 11 June 1938, in an undercover
operation in civilian clothes on a rainy, muddy day, Shlomo remembering that the
inclement weather annoyed the officer. At the village, the officer casually shot all
8 M. Hughes
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
1.1
57
.37
.15
8]
 at
 11
:32
 04
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
15
 
men who were running. He then gathered the surviving villagers and asked Shlomo
how many lashes he thought a man could take. Shlomo replied with the figure of
25, to which the officer said that he would give each villager 13 lashes. The British
officer then whipped all the villagers except the mukhtar (the headman) and a child.
The officer also ‘tortured’ one Palestinian to obtain information on the gangs ‘in a
cruel manner . . . it was a horrible sight’.64 As the officer whipped villagers, village
women begged him to stop and kissed his feet, crying out. Another Jew remembered
a lecture to Danna villagers from Wingate, who spoke Arabic, and villagers being
whipped as they ran away.65 Perhaps the officer angry at the muddy weather was
Wingate, which seems odd considering his well-known, remarkable willingness to
bear long marches and rough field conditions. The SNSs targeted villages for multiple
raids, Zwi Brenner—another future Israeli military leader—watching as Wingate
ordered the villagers of Danna ‘to open their mouths and ordered the English soldiers
to force into their mouths earth soaked in the oil which had poured from the pipeline.
Here, too, Wingate made sure that those who carried this out were English soldiers—
and not the Jews.’66 Shlomo and the British also found two Arabs wounded and dying,
and they conducted ‘a field trial right there and killed them both’.67 Mundane, non-
lethal punishments were also commonplace. Thus, Wingate humiliated local villagers,
making the men of a village run 10–15 kilometres
in front of slowly driving army vehicles. The Arabs who were usually exhausted after
such an ‘exercise’ had then to go all the way back on foot . . . . In some instances
Wingate lined up the Arabs in front of the pipeline, and forced them to wash
their faces with the layer that had formed on the surface of the earth, after the pipe-
line was set on fire. The layer consisted of burning oil mixed with the stones and dirt,
and when the Arabs hesitated to obey his orders, there were always soldiers, who saw
to it that Wingate’s instructions were carried out.68
Howbrook was present at a TAPline rupture where no villager would talk
So Wingate said, ‘Right, we’ll teach these so-and-so’s a lesson.’ So we got all the men
in the village. Oh, outside the . . . . where the oil had been burnt there’s a big pool of
black oil burnt. And we got all the men by the side of this. And then we took an arm
and a leg each and flung them all into the middle of it.69
The use of oil as a torture for villagers appears in biographies of Wingate, too, with
Wingate forcing sand into villagers’ mouths until they vomited.70
Wingate turned to one of the Jews and, pointing to the coughing and spluttering
Arab, said ‘Shoot this man.’ The Jew looked at him questioningly and hesitated.
Wingate said, in a tense voice, ‘Did you hear? Shoot him.’ The Jew shot the Arab.
The others stared for a moment, in stupefaction, at the dead body at their feet.
The boys from Hanita were watching in silence. ‘Now speak’, said Wingate. They
spoke.71
Arabs who looked ‘suspect’ risked beatings and death if caught by the SNSs, as when a
British SNS corporal captured a man at night near the village of Nin (or Nein) who
started begging as he had a weapon on him: ‘killed on the spot’ and his body taken
to the police.72
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The SNSs were the most visible collaboration between the army and the Yishuv but
police units would collaborate with Jewish settlers, as when British police officer Jack
Binsley saw British soldiers go with a Jewish police inspector to the Jewish settlement
of Zichron Yaakov after an Arab attack. Binsley subsequently came across the bodies of
six bayoneted Arab men from a local village on a threshing-room floor in a large grain
store, ‘Dreadful wounds in their chests and stomachs.’ The settlers had primed the sol-
diers with food and drink, after which they ‘rushed’ a local village even though there
was no evidence that any attack had come from there, and they selected six probable
bandits to be bayoneted. ‘The real murderer was the inspector though he had used my
countrymen to carry out his dirty work, knowing that the matter would be hushed up
to avoid a scandal involving British troops’, wrote Binsley.73 The SNSs were not
remarkable in leaving wounded rebels to die on the battlefield: ‘Well, just leave
them. When they got shot it was their fault.’74
British support emboldened Jewish forces, especially supernumerary police, armed
and supported by the British, to fight rebels across Palestine and not just in Galilee.
One British colonial official, A. T. O. Lees, saw Jewish police in trucks enter the
village of Sarafand al-Kharab near Jaffa:
They met the first year little boys from the village school who were just proceeding
from school on their way home. A member of the police hurled a bomb at the little
boys which exploded and killed three of them, two being aged six years each and one
aged seven. The Jews continued their drive, and when passing near the Mosque one
of them fired his rifle at a person who was praying and killed him. Another Jew fired
one shot at a woman carrying her grandchild (aged under two years). The shot killed
the grandmother, while the child was injured and taken to hospital.75
Lees’ account supports Catling’s memory of assassinations in southern Palestine near
Jaffa. Jewish supernumerary police threatened Lees with a ‘Tommy gun’ and barred his
way, after which he heard gunfire:
I heard more bursts of firing which were immediately followed by shrill wails of fem-
inine anguish proceeding from the direction of the big Arab house. Not long after-
wards two or three frantic Arab women from the house burst in upon us,
incoherently explaining that the Jews were upon them and had shot, or were shoot-
ing, every man they could find . . . we heard the sound of the lorry departing. 76
Lees then called the police who arrived and took away two wounded Arabs; the Jewish
police had shot and carried away other men in their lorry. Lees visited the two Arabs in
hospital two days later, on 24 October 1938, and the ‘Arab Medical Officer in charge,
seeing that I was interested in this wanton attempted murder, mentioned that similar
cases were admitted almost daily’.77 Lees reported these cases to police and the civil
authorities but nothing happened.
British military confidence and prowess impressed the Jews in the SNSs. One Jewish
squad fighter, Chaim Levkov, saw how Bredin commanded the battlefield. ‘Here we
found an Arab with a rifle and we killed him; there we found an Arab and we suspected
he had a rifle, and we killed him.’ After a battle in Dabburiyya, Levkov and his unit
found an Arab who had survived the battle, hidden in some straw, begging for his
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life. The Jews hit him until a British soldier came and removed his ‘bayonet from his
rifle and began making a salad of the Arab’. Wingate asked for details of the incident
and his only complaint was that the Arab had died before he could interrogate
him.78 Dan Ram, another Jewish SNS fighter, remarked how the British ‘were won-
derful soldiers’ before saying ‘[b]ut when they were angry there was no limit to
their’, at which point his sentence ends with an exclamatory sigh sounding like
‘hrmmph’.79 Wingate and the British in their short collaboration with the Jews
passed on their counterinsurgency operational method. Ram described Bredin as
a ‘wonderful man’; on one village ‘punishment raid’, Bredin told the Jews to stay
out as they would have to live with these people afterwards and so Bredin went
in with British troops alone.80
Bredin used Jewish Haganah intelligence intercepts in October 1938, when SNS
troops went to the village of Silat al-Dahr after a pipeline attack and where they
chose three villagers, ‘Lufti el Yousef, Mohammed el Youssef and Rashid Ibrahim el
Kassem [Lutfi al-Yusuf, Muhammad al-Yusuf, Rashid Ibrahim al-Qasim], and took
them out 30 metres from the village. There they were tied, shot and they are
dead.’81 King-Clark remembered this incident in correspondence many years later
with one of Wingate’s biographers:
You mentioned to me the incident in Palestine which got Bala Bredin into trouble,
the reprisals he exacted after a particular attack on the pipeline. I was looking at
some of my notes on Wingate’s Palestine papers the other day and read of three
men being shot at the village of Silat el Daher [Silat al-Dahr] in October 1938.82
King-Clark felt that Bredin and his ‘wild’ behaviour helped force the closure of the
SNSs after Wingate’s departure:
Bala could be very tough and uncompromising, ably supported by his ‘Wild Geese.’
In fact, he got so tough with one village on the pipeline that he very nearly got into
real trouble. But it stopped the conflagrations and this saved his bacon! (I’ll tell you
about it sometime.) When Wingate left (in Sep 38?) and Bala carried on, his squad
got a bit Wild West and out of hand and I think that was one of the reasons the SNS
closed down.83
The British Army fought ‘terror with terror’.84 Wingate put Palestinian villagers in a
position of being more afraid of soldiers than rebels. If rebel-gang tracks led to a
village then Wingate’s men burnt down barns, arrested villagers, seized cattle and
when villagers said ‘Commander, sir, what can we do? The gang members come to
us armed, and we are weaponless, and can only surrender to their demands’,
Wingate replied: ‘Two choices: either you be afraid of me and then you can fight
the gangs. I don’t accept the claim that you are poor and can’t do anything.’85
Wingate admitted that said that it was not villagers’ fault, ‘but that is not the question.
I want to reach a situation where the residents of the village will not allow foreigners to
enter their village.’86
The SNS planned raids using intelligence, or they reacted to events with ‘wild’ vio-
lence, as happened at the Tiberias massacre. Thus, when a rebel mine killed the Jewish
leader of Ein Harod settlement, Chaim Sturman, on 14 September 1938, Wingate let
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out a ‘cry, more a scream than an order’ and inflicted ‘the most severe retaliation’ on
the Arab quarter of Beisan (Beit She’an), near the explosion:
‘Everybody into the cars!’ . . . . We grabbed our rifles and within a few seconds were
all in the cars. Without any plan of action or preparation, with Wingate at our head,
we entered the Arab part of Beit Shean, which swarmed with gang members, and
began to beat and trample anyone in our path. Wingate himself went out of
control, entering stores and destroying whatever was in them. An hour later we
returned to Ein Harod.87
Sympathetic biographers gloss over Wingate’s ordering ‘the killing of every Arab discov-
ered in the vicinity of the raid’ on Beisan, pointing to his emotional state and the ‘wild
inconsidered orders made in the heat of the moment’ before attacking Beisan and so
‘some innocent loiterers were shot among fleeing rebels who returned fire. It was a
sudden unprepared raid, a mistake on Wingate’s part, uncharacteristic of his teaching.’88
Wingate and his squads launched prepared and reactive punishment raids, as the
situation demanded, and Wingate’s volatile temper prompted casual impromptu vio-
lence towards Arabs as at Beisan or when Jewish operatives were speaking with an old
Palestinian with trachoma and a limp who worked for them as a spy, with a view to
using him as a guide for a village raid. Wingate demanded ‘“fetch me this Arab” . . . .
and the spy was brought to him. He stepped very close to him, fixed him with his
eyes, and began to question him in Arabic. Suddenly he stepped back and dealt the
Arab a heavy blow across the neck which felled him to the ground.’89 King-Clark hit
one local man so hard during a raid on Tilleil (presumably Tuleil) on Lake Huleh
that he broke his hand.90 Even when raids were prepared following intelligence
leads, unplanned ‘wild’ violence could erupt. Thus, in early September 1938,
Wingate had intelligence that incriminated the mukhtar of Tantura, so he went with
a squad to the village and rounded up villagers to find the guilty man. The raid
then turned nasty, as one of his biographers recounts, with a soldier forced to shoot
a fleeing villager: ‘Then while Wingate was going down the line examining the prison-
ers one of them dashed away and fled and was instantly shot by a squadsman.’91 ‘Shot
trying to escape’ was a convenient euphemism for assassinations, one of the Jewish sol-
diers present, Levkov, recalling that Wingate went to Tantura and shot an innocent
Arab by accident, a local man who was also in the Jewish trade union Histadrut.
Levkov also accused British officers of being drunk in action, after Wingate had left
the squads.92
The End of the SNSs
The regular army was not shy of using violence against rebels and the closure of the
SNSs concerned the proper governance of Palestine and the formal regulation and jus-
tification of force as much as it was about opposition to the use of excess force.
Wingate operated off the official grid and the army and police were uncomfortable
with ‘swashbuckling’ special units that were ‘free and easy’ in their attitude to
regular forces, as King-Clark noted in his memoirs:
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The Army, traditionally, viewed us with the suspicion it reserves for ‘private
armies’—with a tinge, perhaps, of envy at our being ‘outside the law’ and of
respect at the results we were achieving . . . . As far as the Palestine Police were con-
cerned . . . we were in trouble very early on, due to the liberties we took in enter-
ing—and sometimes searching—Arab villages without warning and with no
police escort. At the very beginning—in June—a policemen did sometimes accom-
pany us on patrol, but as we became fitter and they didn’t, they soon disappeared
from the SNS scene. We didn’t really blame them, however, since their life work
was the non-partisan maintenance of civil law and order operating from police
stations and posts throughout the country. In their eyes, in contrast, we must
have appeared as a very fly-by-night biased organisation.93
Senior Jewish officials were surprised that Wingate survived as long as he did in Pales-
tine, convinced that everyone was against him except Wavell and ‘Ritchi’, presumably
the RAF intelligence chief at army headquarters, Alan Ritchie.94 Evetts’ support was
also vitally necessary in the face of other local regimental commanders in Galilee
who were unhappy with what the SNSs were doing.95 That King-Clark and his
fellow British squad members showed off about their successes against rebels earned
them few friends outside the Yishuv:
To be fair to the Army and Police, the antipathy they felt towards the SNS was jus-
tifiably aggravated by the fact that we became rather swollen-headed about our ima-
gined toughness and our ‘killing rate.’ We did get very bumptious towards the end
and there were one or two cases of ‘Wild West, six-shooter’ exuberance foreign to
normal British Army behaviour—but good fun nevertheless—(with Bala Bredin’s
‘Wild Geese’ well to the fore). I think GHQ was wise to send Wingate home and
close the whole thing down—for a number of reasons, including the ‘private
army’ angle—when it did.96
By September 1938, Haining had made up his mind to tell Evetts to close down the
SNS units, just as the Munich settlement on Czechoslovakia freed up masses of
regular British troops for deployment to Palestine. Once the Munich crisis had
passed and British troops were not needed for a European war, the SNSs were
surplus to needs. Without the Munich settlement of September 1938, the SNSs
might have survived, General William Ironside, commander of Middle East forces
in 1939, writing to Wingate about how if the Czechoslovakia crisis ‘had developed I
had made up my mind to arm the Jews and to withdraw most of my troops’.97
Support for the SNSs was always partial and the army and Foreign Office had never
countenanced the creation of Jewish-only units, as units such as these would have been
a diplomatic disaster for British relations with the wider Arab world. The War Office in
London wrote to General John Dill, GOC Palestine and so Wavell’s predecessor, in
February 1937, following a conference on Palestine, informing him how
The Foreign Office representative at the conference made it quite clear that they
would view with the gravest apprehension any idea of using the Jews in offensive
operations against the Arabs. They foresaw that this might drive the whole of the
Arabs together, and result in a general conflagration in Iraq and elsewhere. There
would be no objection to using the Jews in a defensive role in their own localities,
but not in the Arab localities.98
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Wavell heeded this advice when he agreed to the formation of the British-led SNSs in
early 1938, but some squads eventually operated at times as Jewish-only units, as
settler-soldiers became more confident in their martial skills. Haining had less time
for Wingate than his mentor, Wavell. Moreover, Wingate’s superiors may not have
understood fully what was going on in Galilee, at least in the first few months of
SNS operations when the whole of Palestine was in turmoil, central command in Jer-
usalem was focused on other things and reports were not yet in on SNS operations.99
Certainly, the high command ‘knew perfectly well’ that its soldiers were training Jews
but chose to ignore this while it suited them, giving the SNSs a short window of oppor-
tunity that was then closed.100 Pressure against the SNSs soon mounted within the
British establishment in Palestine. Not just civil officials and police, but many
British intelligence officers objected to Wingate’s harsh policies, convinced that they
alienated the Arabs. A convention of British intelligence officers in the north of Pales-
tine at the end of January 1939 agreed not to employ Jews as this provoked the Pales-
tinians, a decision that annoyed Wingate but about which he could do little but protest
as his squads were now on the decline.101 The British authorities also suspected
Wingate of leaking intelligence to the Yishuv so they bugged his telephone and
made his life ‘unbearable’.102 British intelligence monitoring extended to Wingate’s
wife and her mother, possibly the result of an army investigation into an ‘execution’
order given by Wingate to Jewish soldiers in an Arab village.103 Haining praised
Wingate after the latter had left Palestine, but saw his bias to the Zionist cause as so
great ‘as to render his services in the Intelligence Branch nugatory and embarrassing.
His removal to another sphere of action has been timely.’104 Wingate’s ‘thuggery’
threatened to ruin the proper governance of Palestine, as local civil administrators
recognised: ‘the people he was bumping off, any odd Arabs who happened to go
into the village at night, they weren’t necessarily men who were blowing up the pipe-
line.’105 British colonial government in Palestine was never strong financially or mili-
tarily and it relied on forms of local consent that local administrators had to manage
after the soldiers had gone.106 The SNSs were victims of their own success, their
rampant violence that cowed the Palestinians ultimately offending the sensibilities
of the British military high command, which shied away from absolute irregular
force in favour of moderated regular force, and so closed the squads and dismissed
Wingate.
‘Passing It On’
Intuitively, one would expect the many Jews trained by Wingate to learn from his
methods, and those of the British army, the experts in colonial pacification.
Wingate was idiosyncratic and passionate—Bredin saw in Wingate the ‘fervour of a
fanatic’, while another British official who worked with Wingate in Sudan described
him as a ‘dangerous madman’—but his basic approach to countering rebels was
that of the army, as it was with officers like Bredin and King-Clark.107 That said,
the SNSs pushed British counter-insurgency to an unrestrained extreme, making
any form of normal relations with Palestinians impossible. The future commander
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of the Haganah strike force, the Palmach, Yitzhak Sadeh, noted this, writing in June
1938 how the ‘way these squads operate (searching in village accompanied by beatings
etc.) could, according to the opinion of several people from this region complicate us
in undesirable relations with the neighbours’.108 What this article does not discuss is
how some Jews thought Wingate to be more trouble than he was worth.109 Wingate
passed on to the Jews levels of unrestrained violence not easily used by regular
British soldiers but which were routine in the SNSs. The SNSs forged future Israeli
military supreme commanders such as Moshe Dayan, who served with Wingate and
was impressed by his ‘utter ruthlessness’ and willingness to shoot Arabs ‘on the spot
to make an example to others’ and whose ‘affection’ for Wingate ‘knew no bounds.
The Haganah men called him Hayedid (the Friend) and realised there was a lot to
be said for his conviction that the best defence was attack.’110 James Pollock, a district
commissioner, put it more bluntly: ‘Wingate taught the Jews blood-letting and they’ve
never looked back.’ 111 Dayan wrote later how, while early Jewish military leaders such
as Sadeh implanted more aggressive, commando thinking among Jewish fighters, what
really impressed Dayan was Wingate’s ‘professionalism’ that came from his British
army training. Wingate had ‘positiveness, a stubborn lack of compromise. A dominat-
ing personality he infected us all with his fanaticism and faith.’112 Wingate’s aim was to
create a Jewish army, telling Haganah men,
‘You will now listen very carefully to what I am going to say to you, and you will
never forget my words. Today is a memorable day for the people of Israel, for
today you see the beginning of the Jewish Army’ . . . . These were words which
even the Hagana men didn’t utter out loud. But that was exactly what Captain
Orde Wingate had in mind.113
Wingate’s legacy endured in the Yishuv long after his departure from Palestine. Harry
Levin, besieged in Jewish west Jerusalem in May 1948, wrote in his diary of that
‘strange, lovable Englishman’ Wingate, who ‘laid the foundations’ of the Palmach, a
force then fighting to lift the siege of the city.114 Wingate passed on tactical training
through the SNSs but also at the higher levels an active, aggressive spirit, and as a ‘pro-
fessional officer of the British army, his views carried great weight with the political
leaders in charge of the Haganah’.115 Wingate’s exacting SNS training regime, with
its long route marches, in which he struck Jewish recruits in the face—‘they appeared
to lap it up’ remembered Bredin—brutalised Jewish soldiers and normalised violence,
as does any recruit boot camp for elite military units.116 British soldiers such as Cor-
poral Howbrook serving with King-Clark’s squad had been through bounded, estab-
lished British military training, and in his time with the SNS he saw the eccentric
Wingate treat the Jews ‘almost like dirt . . . the rank and file he could do anything
with them. He could push them around and order them about. And they’d almost
run like kittens, little puppies.’117
The British taught the Jews to use cold steel in action against Arab rebels, to go in
with the bayonet, the ultimate act of personal killing, as at Khirbat Lidd/Lyd (often
Khirbat Bayt Lidd) with King-Clark’s squad in September 1938 where soldiers could
see an Arab hiding behind a wall. King-Clark called in his nearest Jewish soldiers:
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I think it was David from Deganiya [presumably Kibbutz Degania Bet south of Lake
Tiberias], and made bayonet-fighting motions with my arms. I remember his eyes
widening as he pointed to his fixed bayonet. I nodded vigorously, he took off and
we watched as he ran the fifty yards to the wall, jumped on it and repeatedly
stabbed down on the far side with his rifle and bayonet. A minute later he was
back at my side, an old Mauser rifle in his free hand, his own bayonet blooded to
the hilt, his eyes wide with the shock of what he had just done.118
Haganah units joined in this attack, or another attack at a different time directed at the
same village, including future Israeli commanders Yigal Allon, Shimon Avidan and
Moshe Dayan, where, tellingly, British troops had to stop Jewish fighters in the
SNSs beating Palestinians and looting their houses.119
Conclusion
The study here of the British army’s use of the Special Night Squads is a case study
of how imperial powers will use an indigenous loyalist colonial community to help
pacify rebels. The empirical detail of the brutality of the squads is striking but not
surprising, as the British military empowered and mobilised local settlers with a
visceral stake in Palestine’s future, as would happen in other colonies such as
Kenya in the 1950s. The British army was conservative as an institution and ambiva-
lent when it came to irregular war in the style of the SNSs, and so eventually closed
down the squads after a short, partial operational life, one marred by egregious atro-
cities that offended the sensibilities of the British high command, local civil officials
and other army officers. Central military control managed and mediated the vio-
lence of pacification, and in counterinsurgencies the use of ‘special forces’ invariably
came up against military hierarchies suspicious of soldiers operating independently,
justifiably worried about accusations concerning out-of-control death squads and
‘dirty wars’. Wavell agreed to the formation of the SNSs, but the inspiration for
the squads came from Wingate, and locally from commanders such as Evetts,
bypassing central military command structures except for the initial agreement to
create what was then a new unknown force, proving the power of local initiatives
when it came to counterinsurgency. The basic tactics of the SNSs were those of
the British army, with collective punishment for local hostile populations who
were supporting armed insurgents, tactics that became starkly visible when
crudely employed by unorthodox military units such as the SNSs whose comman-
der, Wingate, did nothing to hide the inherent violence of counterinsurgency.
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Notes
Readers will allow some imprecision in the use of ‘Yishuv’, ‘Zionists’, ‘Jewish’ and ‘Jews’ in this article,
all of which will refer to the Jewish community in Palestine before 1948; in some contexts, the use of
‘Jews/Jewish’ suits the language employed at the time and is unavoidable if imprecise. Similar
comment applies to the mixed use of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Palestinians’.
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